## Final CWG IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal: Basic Elements

## IANA OPERATIONS

<u>Post Transition IANA</u> (PTI): (see page 21 of the CWG proposal) this non-profit corporation would be controlled by ICANN with a majority of the 5 person board being ICANN or PTI staff. All of ICANN's naming related IANA staff and assets would be transferred to this new company, ensuring further separation of the policy and operational aspects of IANA. ICANN would enter into a contract, substantially similar to the current NTIA contract, with PTI for the provision of the IANA naming services.

Noteworthy ccTLD dimension: the NTIA's current 'authorization function' role will not be replaced.

<u>Service Level Expectations</u> (SLE's): (<u>see page 25, Annex H, page 79</u>) the current SLE's will be reevaluated and likely revised, guided by a set of principles recommend by the CWG.

Noteworthy ccTLD dimension: development of SLE's will continue with ccTLD participation

<u>Customer Standing Committee</u> (CSC): (see page 24, and Annex H, page 70) this standing committee would monitor the operational performance of PTI relative to the SLEs. It would also have a role in resolving disputes and in initiating 'special reviews' (see below). Co-chaired by RySG and ccNSO appointees, it would have 5 registry members (2 ccTLDs, 2 gTLDs, 1 non gTLD or ccTLD) and liaisons from six ICANN SO/ACs and from PTI.

Noteworthy ccTLD dimension: 2 of the 5 CSC members will be ccTLDs; don't need to be from ccNSO

Problem Resolution & Escalation Mechanisms: (see page 26, Annex G, page 75, and Annex J, page 84)

**Phase 1**. Complaints are reviewed by a series of PTI staff then by ICANN Ombudsman; the complainant may request mediation and/or go to the Independent Review Process; CSC is informed of complaints but does not become directly involve in direct disputes.

**Phase 2.** CSC reports persistent problems to PTI staff and seeks resolution within a certain time frame; unresolved issues are escalated to the PTI Board and then to ICANN staff, CEO and then Board. Systemic problems are referred to ccNSO and GNSO who together can request the establishment of a Special IFRT (see below), which requires a supermajority vote on both SOs.

IANA PERFORMANCE REVIEW (see page 23, Annex F, page 63)

<u>IANA Functional Review Team</u> (IFR): there will be periodic reviews (the first within 2 years; every five years thereafter) of the performance of the IANA functions and of the need for changes to the statement of work.

*Noteworthy ccTLD dimension:* 3 of the review team members will be ccTLDs with one non-ccNSO chosen following consultation with the ROs.

<u>Special IANA Function Review</u> (SIFR): should the problem resolution process noted above fail to address an issue, a non-periodic review could be initiated to focus on that specific problem. The composition of the review team would be identical to the IFR, including 3 ccTLDs.

Noteworthy ccTLD dimension: a SIFR would require the approval of the ccNSO and GNSO, each by supermajority.

<u>Separation Process</u>: (see page 26, Annex L, page 89) an IFR could recommend the creation of a Cross Community Working Group on Separation (SCWG), but the decision would require the approval of both the ccNSO and GNSO, by supermajority, as well as by the ICANN Board, but an ICANN Board rejection would require a supermajority. There would be no predetermined outcome of the SCWG – it could recommend no action, a new operator or the initiation of an RFP.

*Noteworthy ccTLD dimension:* requires supermajority of the ccNSO and would have 3 ccTLDs chosen in same way as for IFRTs

## **CCWG DEPENDENCIES**

The CWG proposal is significantly dependent and expressly conditioned on the implementation of ICANN-level accountability mechanisms proposed by the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability), in particular the proposals for 'fundamental bylaws'. The co-chairs of the CWG-Stewardship and the CCWG-Accountability have coordinated their efforts and the CWG-Stewardship is confident that the CCWG-Accountability recommendations, if implemented as expected, will meet the requirements that the CWG-Stewardship has previously communicated to the CCWG.